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Abstract:  
This study aimed to analyze the intentionally fiscal position of the governments of developing 
countries. Our results suggest that a significant proportion of developing countries adopts 
counter-cyclical positions. However, forecasting errors weak their positions. Results lead to 
conclude that if developing countries want to increase the effectiveness of their fiscal policies, 
they must build the skills of their forecast offices, and enhance the political and institutional 
framework governing the budget process. 
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 I. Introduction 
The recent crisis of 2008 has led to a renewed interest in Keynesian policies. Faced with the 
global downturn, the cyclical policies were seen as a remedy capable of restoring 
growth. There is recent empirical evidence that developed countries have intentionally 
designed countercyclical policies. This implies that these states were sympathetic, since the 
purpose of such policies is to support economic activity. In developing countries, however, 
few studies have asked about the real intentions of governments in terms of fiscal policies. If 
intentional, governments of developing countries have implemented pro-cyclical policies 
would mean that they are ill-disposed to the image of "Leviathan" presented by political 
economy. The question is to know which policies were designed. Have the governments 
designed procyclical or countercyclical policies? 
According to the literature, fiscal policy was pro-cyclical in all developing 
countries (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Agenor, McDermott and Prasad, 1999; Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Végh, 2004). Based on this result, it is generally accepted that the procyclicality 
would consciously desired by policymakers for electoral reasons. However, the lessons 
learned from work on the behavior of the monetary authorities could lead us to question the 
validity of such a belief. 
The common point of the previous studies is the use of revised data. If these studies are 
effective in determining the meaning "in fine" of fiscal policy, they are not suitable for 
assessing the budgetary position "real" or intentional government (Orphanides, 2001; Forni 
and Momigliano, 2004; Cimadomo, 2008). The analysis of the government's position should 
be based on the information available to decision makers in real time. The position of the 
State could thus be understood by stakeholder changes in the budget in year t + 1, following 
the conditions in year t to which the government faces. However, previous studies have 
privileged data that revisions can be significant (see graph 1). The main consequence of these 
revisions is that the value of GDP could be different from one year to another. Now, 
governments are accustomed to adopt their position relative to their perception of the output 
gap
2
. This implies that if at time t the government increases spending following a negative 
gap in real time, a revision of GDP ex-post that would lead to a positive gap would lead to a 
finding of procyclical behavior of government. In this context, analyze the position of States 
on the revised database could be problematic because the position they would suggest, the 
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 result could be "in fine" of institutional and macroeconomic factors, but not necessarily the 
intention of government. This implies that the role assigned to governments could be only 
a "non-sequitur." Another formulation of the problem may emerge if we look at the 
implication of the use of revised data. If the objective is to study the behavior of the 
government, the use of revised data implies an assumption of high availability. Indeed, this 
implies that the data available to the researcher are the same as those available to the 
government. However, as confirmed in Chart 1, this assumption is not always true. 
Moreover, the difficulties associated with forecasting exercises developing countries have 
rarely been seen in previous models. Yet these difficulties have been identified in the 
literature as additional constraints to the implementation of fiscal policy (IMF, 2010)
3
. Few 
studies to our knowledge have examined the role of forecast errors on the position of 
governments. However, such a study could tell us more about the behavior of states. It would 
be important to know why government's position is often procyclical to design a better policy 
reaction. 
In this study, we follow the approach of Bernoth, Hughes and Lewis (2008) to determine the 
position of the government and the impact of forecast errors. According to the arguments 
of Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004 and Lledó, Yackovlev and Gadenne (2011), we 
analyze the position of the State from the total expenditure. In addition, we correct the 
possible endogeneity bias by using the generalized method of moments. 
The article is organized as follows: Section 1 highlights the concept of real-time analysis and 
measurement, section 2 provides an overview of the literature on the position of States, and 
the final section presents the applied analysis. 
II. ANALYSIS IN REAL TIME 
1.  Concept 
The real-time analysis recently appeared in empirical work on monetary policy. This approach 
was implemented by Orphanides (2001), to investigate the robustness of the policy 
recommendations in the area of monetary authorities in the United States. In his study, he 
showed that when unrealistic assumptions about the data are made available opportunity, 
especially when it is assumed that the information updated and revised previously are 
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 available to policy makers, behavior analysis politicians can lead to misleading results. Since 
this approach has opened new avenues of research and helped many works. 
The concept of real-time analysis or "Real Data" is based on exploration data available to 
decision makers at the time of decision making. These data are distinguished in the literature 
by the name of data "ex-ante". The revised data are for their data called "ex-post". 
The uses of ex-ante budget analysis data in reports to a particular frame. During the financial 
year (t) are tabulated resources and expenditure. Based on these figures, the government 
conducts a screening of these indicators to the end of the year, and designs its objectives of 
revenue and expenditure for the next fiscal year (t + 1). These objectives are then included in 
the draft Finance Act, which will be submitted to the vote of Parliament. 
As part of our study, we will use as a proxy for ex-ante governments GDP, GDP in the current 
year, published in each version of the IMF WEO
4
. This choice is justified by the fact that 
most of the WEO projections are the result of discussions, during which the IMF staff and 
national authorities agree on the projection assumptions for the end of the current year and for 
the following year. On many consultations5  relating to several countries, we have not 
observed significant differences between the projections of the IMF and the national 
authorities. Instead, the IMF figures vary in the same direction as the national 
figures. Moreover, the IMF WEO database provides a uniform and consistent measure of 
output, which alleviates the differences in national accounting. Finally, according Lledo and 
Pibeiro-Poplawski (2011) these data are very reliable because they embody the best estimates 
of the IMF plans and feasible viable national authorities, even though they do not always 
reflect their views in full
6
. 
2.  Notation 
The use of real-time analysis uses a special notation. Let t represents time (Annual or 
Monthly), and V any variable. It is commonly accepted the following notation:       , 
which defined the value of the variable V to the period which is provided for the period   
 . If    ,        corresponds to a forecast. If    ,      corresponds to the real time value, 
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 in the sense that it is the latter which is available to the decision-maker. If    ,        
corresponds to the value of the variable published years after the event (revised). Note that is 
a natural number. 
III. Literary and temperature 
Fiscal policy has given rise to numerous empirical studies. In developing countries, there is a 
consensus on the procyclicality of fiscal policy, primarily based on ex-post data. Gavin and 
Perotti (1997) were the first to draw attention to the fact that tax policy Latin America seems 
average procyclical, with recessions are associated with exaggerated collapses in public 
expenditure. This result is confirmed by Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999), who find a way 
correlation coefficient of 0.52 between the cyclical component of public consumption and the 
cyclical component of production over the period 1970-1995 for sample of 26 Latin American 
countries. Similarly, from a sample of 36 developing countries from Asia, Africa, the Middle 
East, and Latin America Talvi and Carlos Vegh (2000) find that public consumption is very 
pro-cyclical, with a correlation coefficient of 0.53. However, Agenor, McDermott and Prasad 
(1999) note that government consumption expenditures countercyclical for a group of four 
middle-income countries i.e. Chile, Korea, Mexico and the Philippines. 
Kaminsky, Graciela, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) will re-evaluate fiscal policy in developing 
countries. They find that fiscal policy is procyclical in their sub-sample of 83 low-income 
countries and middle income. This will be confirmed by Akitoby, Clements, Gupta and 
Inchauste (2004). 
Furthermore, Empirical studies suggest that the introduction of a countercyclical policy would 
face several factors. The various budget stages and the race for power of different political 
factions (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977; Lane and Tornell, 1996, 1999; Woo, 2003a, b, 
2005; Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen, 2004), difficulties in evaluation of real cycles 
leading to lags in the selection and implementation of fiscal policy (Akitoby et al, 2004), the 
low share of transfer expenditures reducing the scope of the automatic stabilizers (Lane, 
2003b), financial constraints and limited access to capital markets, are all reasons that can 
lead to a procyclical fiscal policy (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky et al., 2004)
7
. When 
discretionary action results in a pro-cyclical stance, these factors are likely to amplify 
economic fluctuations. 
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 It appears from this literature review that previous work did not provide concrete evidence of 
the willingness of the government. There is only that suspicions, based primarily on the use of 
ex-post data. In the next section, we present an analytical framework to mitigate potential bias 
related to data availability hypothesis before proceeding with an econometric estimation. 
IV. APPLIED ANALYSIS 
1.  Determination of output 
A consequence of the time analysis is that the estimate of the output can now be done directly 
from the revised GDP data. The government decided to adopt the position that according to 
the evolution of output (Output gap) and the level of fiscal indicators. However, it does not 
have the revised data as they present themselves today. To retrieve the output in real time, we 
must first identify the part of the final data due to revisions. Thus, the problem can be 
formalized according Bernoth, Hughes and Lewis (2008) by decomposing the GDP (Y) as 
follows: 
           (1)  
With     potential value of GDP and    output gap. No revisions data of each vintage would 
be the same. The various revisions therefore imply that: 
                      (2)  
       
       
          (3)  
With        GDP of year   estimated at the year    ,       the latest available GDP.       
   is 
the potential value of GDP calculated on the basis of the information available at    ,        
the gap between GDP in real-time and final GDP and        the gap between potential output 
in real time and the final potential GDP. 
Finally, the combination of equations (1) (2) and (3) allows the output estimated in real time 
based on the final GDP and different deviations implied revisions: 
                       
  (4)  
                             (5)  
                              
(6)  
 Knowing that the latest version (i.e. t+s = f) is a given and that only vary the data of previous 
vintages, equation (6) implies that the gap in real time and the difference between the gaps 
move in the same direction. 
2. Construction of fiscal reaction function 
The study discretionary policies require a model to capture the variations of fiscal indicator 
compared to the production space (output gap). Most empirical studies use the budget 
balance (SB) as the dependent variable and a set of control variables (X). Generally, the 
models used adopt the following form: 
                                     (7)  
In this form, however, this model has some shortcomings: 
1. First, the use of the budgetary balance may be problematic in the context of 
sub-Saharan African countries, and in particular in the case of UEMOA countries. 
These countries are heavily dependent on external resource flows. These flows are 
unstable. As a result, the level of resources and the overall balance do not always 
correspond to the will of public decision-makers (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 
2004; Lledo et al., 2009). 
2. Then, this model is designed to exploit ex-post data information. But, as 
mentioned above, these data lead to a bias in the results. 
To overcome the first problem, Kaminsky, Graciela, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) and Lledó, 
Yackovlev, and Gadenne (2011) advocate the use of government spending instead of the 
budget balance. They argue that in developing countries, spending is more telling of the will 
of the state. 
Regarding the second problem, Forni and Momigliano (2004) and Cimadomo (2008) equation 
is entirely based on the data in real time: 
                                                        (8)  
Their intuition is that the government provides its position according to real-time 
conditions. In this model, the fiscal balance (   ) is adjusted for its cyclical variation, and the 
government's position is captured by the sign  .  So if     fiscal policy is 
countercyclical; otherwise it is procyclical. But if    , fiscal policy is acyclic. However, 
two observations can be made. The first point is that the equation (8) is responsive to the 
correction of the cyclic variations in tool. In the case of the use of Prescott filter, the 
smoothing parameter determines the series obtained. Several studies agree that the smoothing 
 of fiscal indicators would be hazardous in sub-Saharan Africa (Lledó, Yackovlev, and 
Gadenne, 2011). The second is that the level in real time in the dependent variable might just 
match what was recorded, not necessarily to decision makers (Hughes et al, 2008). 
For all these reasons, we proceed as Hughes et al (2008) to establish reaction function 
operator information ex post data while mitigating through revision. The starting point of the 
model is the assumption that the budget ( ) is responsive to three elements. First, a portion of 
the budget is supposed to automatically respond at the current production. This hypothesis is 
that several studies argue that automatic stabilizer ( ) plays a role in developing 
countries (Chami, Hakura and Montiel, 2009;  Suescun, Rodrigo, 2007;  Debrun and 
Kapoor, 2010). 
Then let some work believe that part of the budget would depend on potential output. For 
example, incentives for international technical assistance to increase the tax burden where to 
cut spending often based on the exploration of potential GDP. Thus, parameter   capture 
discretionary changes following potential GDP. 
Finally, the government adopts its position based on its perception of the production 
space. Therefore   captures the discretionary state action. So we have: 
                        
                 
   (9)  
When the data used are those for the latest year available, we have: 
                    
                 
   (10)  
Substituting (2) and (3) in (9), and one obtains: 
               
                                       (11)  
Equation (11) means that the real position of the government may be captured by the sign of 
 . It also means that fiscal policy is based on differences between ex-ante and ex-post values 
of potential GDP. This equation also suggests that the coefficient of ex-post gap is composed 
of the position of the State and the impact of automatic stabilizers. Finally, we express all 
variables in ratio of final potential GDP to avoid any problems of measures and minimize the 
influence of ex-ante GDP
8
, we get: 
                                                  (12)  
                                                          
8
 See Bayoumi and Masson (1995) or MARINHEIRO (2007) for a similar use 
                                 (13)  
3. Estimation Method 
To effectively capture the decision makers, we estimate the following equations: 
                                           (14)  
                                            (15)  
Where the vector Ԑ idiosyncratic errors, is a vector of relevant variables considered in the 
literature. We introduce the control variables from the public debt, which allows the level of 
spending lagged to take account of initial conditions. 
We begin our analysis by pooling test. We find that the P-value of Fisher test is below the 5% 
threshold. We therefore conclude that there are fixed effects. We then apply the unit root test 
of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). For lags of 1 to 3, we find a lower P-value to the significance 
level. This implies that our variables are stationary and therefore do not need to be 
differentiated to perform regressions. 
The presence of the lagged dependent variable in our model implies that the OLS estimator is 
not consistent. The literature in this case recommends the use of the generalized method of 
moments (GMM). We use the system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998), which 
uses lagged differences of the dependent variable as instruments of level equations and level 
lagged variables as instruments of difference equations. According to these authors, this 
estimator significantly improves the performance of the estimator in difference of Arellano 
and Bond (1991). Moreover, Bun and Kiviet (2006) and Hayakawa (2007) show that face a 
dynamic panel, where the individual and temporal dimensions are finished, the system GMM 
estimator is a safe choice compared to the estimator in difference of Arellano and Bond 
(1991)
9
. 
The results of the GMM are validated by three conditions. Must be an adequate number of 
lags, because a large number of lags reduces significance of Hansen identification test. In 
addition, for the building GMM involves the autocorrelation of the first order, the results are 
only relevant if there is no autocorrelation of order 2. Another important point is that the 
number of instruments should be less than the number of sample observation. Finally, the 
choice of the endogenous variable or not affects the quality of results. Next Kiviet and Bun 
(2006) and Hughes et al (2008), we choose to limit to three the number of lags in the level 
equations and difference. We consider the variables v, z and lagged expenditures (dep) as 
weakly endogenous and debt as endogenous in all equations. 
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4.  Descriptive Analysis 
The table (1) presents the descriptive statistics of our key variables. The average debt and 
spending, and their dispersion seem relatively low. By cons, very high average is observed 
and a very strong dispersion for goodwill estimate of potential GDP (v) and the output gap 
(z). These high numbers may partly be explained by the revision of the calculation of 
GDP. Some countries have revised their method of calculating GDP, which led to strong 
upward revisions of GDP. Certainly, this type of review is not really a mistake, but for our 
purposes we assimilate to the GDP estimation error. This choice can be justified by the fact 
that if these changes had occurred at the time of the catch of past positions, the government's 
behavior would not have been the same. In addition, a new calculation suggests that the old 
way was not sufficiently representative of reality, and therefore was more likely to be 
misleading. 
We build two graphs (Graph 1 and Graph 2) representing the evolution of expenditure 
respectively from the output then compared to ex-ante and ex-post differences in potential 
GDP. The two graphs confirm the strong dispersion of the variables in the output gap ex ante 
and the error associated with the estimate of potential GDP. Furthermore, Graph 1 shows a 
downward trend, implying that an increase in the output gap is followed by reduction of final 
expenditure. As against the Graph 2 shows an upward trend, which implies that expenses are 
moving in the same direction as the estimation of potential output errors. 
 
 
Graph 1: Expenditure in relation to ex-ante gap                            Graph 2: Expenditure compared to forecast errors of potential GDP 
 
 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
Output gap ex-ante
Dépenses ex-post 90% CI
Fitted values
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
-100 -50 0 50
Ecart PIB potentiel ex-ante et ex-post
Dépenses ex-post 90% CI
Fitted values
 5.  Estimates of the position of governments 
Table (2) shows the results of the estimation in GMM system. To test the robustness of our 
results, we first include a dummy variable (ele) representative election years. We hope to 
capture the influence of electoral cycles. Overall the results remain the same in columns (3) 
and (4). We then perform our regressions using as instrument the time fixed effects. Intuition 
is to capture the influence of exogenous shocks that may have influenced the willingness of 
governments during the period. We find similar results in columns (5) and (6). 
It is noted that the lagged expenses are significantly positive in all columns, while the debt is 
not significant. This underlines the importance of the level of spending in the decision making 
process in accordance with the literature. The insignificance of debt contrary to the 
predictions of the literature could be explained by the substantial debt reductions that 
benefited a number of developing countries 
In columns (1), (3) and (5), the government's position (z) is significantly negative.  These 
results mean that developing countries generally have designed countercyclical policies over 
the period. Regarding the forecast errors of potential GDP (v), we see that they are 
significantly negative. These results mean that the forecast errors of potential GDP have 
reduced spending. This implies that the government's reaction has been reduced below the 
optimal level over the period. 
In all columns, we find that the final output gap is significantly positive. Referring to equation 
(11), this means that the automatic stabilizers have had a positive impact on spending. This 
result could be explained by weak institutions in developing countries, according to the 
literature that may affect the operation of automatic stabilizers. 
V. Conclusion 
This study aimed to define the desired position intentionally by the governments of 
developing countries. This analysis was based on recent literature data in real time. To achieve 
our goal, we first conduct a theoretical analysis of the composition of the output gap, and we 
have built a fiscal reaction function for capturing the intentional government position. 
Our results suggest that a significant proportion of developing countries have adopted 
counter-cyclical positions. However, errors in assessments of potential GDP contribute to 
weak their positions. In other words, these governments have desired implement 
countercyclical policies, but have been misled by an incorrect assessment of their potential 
GDP. 
Overall, these results are perplexing as to the effectiveness of fiscal policies. Indeed, although 
the intentional position of developing countries appears to be countercyclical, the ex-post 
 outcome of procyclical policies is found in most studies. This leads us to believe that the 
causes mentioned in the literature probably prevent the stabilization budgetary measures so 
that their performances are not made on time, or not do against the economic cycle. 
Finally, this study leads to think that if developing countries want to increase the effectiveness 
of their policies, they must build the skills of their forecast offices, and enhance the political 
and institutional framework governing the budget process. 
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 Annexe 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean Std, Dev, Min Max Observations 
dep overall 27,06588 9,913545 7,641634 69,08222 N =     967 
 
between 
 
8,969172 12,0718 54,94913 n =      88 
 
within 
 
4,310777 9,219536 51,63324 
T-bar = 
10,9886 
       
z overall 8069,405 218652,7 -1044613 6195050 N =     872 
 
between 
 
70746,52 -0,2720785 663803,8 n =      88 
 
within 
 
206906,4 -1700347 5539316 
T-bar = 
9,90909 
       
v overall 248881,2 4268711 -52,90131 7,73E+07 N =     960 
 
between 
 
2221736 -44,16213 2,08E+07 n =      88 
 
within 
 
3646440 -2,06E+07 5,67E+07 
T-bar = 
10,9091 
       
dette overall 53,46672 57,6111 0,7218315 685,1997 N =     946 
 
between 
 
44,39315 4,817206 333,9763 n =      86 
 
within 
 
37,00191 -253,2897 404,6901 T =      11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Results 
 Baseline model Election dummy IV Time dummy 
VARIABLES Ex-ante (1) Ex-post (2) Ex-ante (3) Ex-post (4) Ex-ante (5) Ex-post (6) 
       
z -1.28e-06***  -1.18e-06***  -1.43e-06***  
 (2.33e-07)  (2.60e-07)  (2.48e-07)  
v -6.32e-08***  -5.65e-08***  -6.29e-08***  
 (1.71e-08)  (1.71e-08)  (1.29e-08)  
gapf 0.272*** 0.237*** 0.300*** 0.245*** 0.235*** 0.270*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0526) (0.0606) (0.0615) (0.0586) (0.0576) 
dette -0.00720 0.00314 -0.0157 0.00400 -0.00211 0.0101* 
 (0.0104) (0.00483) (0.00991) (0.00630) (0.0166) (0.00537) 
L.dep 0.999*** 0.775*** 0.967*** 0.798*** 1.016*** 0.719*** 
 (0.0910) (0.120) (0.0966) (0.133) (0.0652) (0.0844) 
ele   0.00525* 0.00484   
   (0.00305) (0.00401)   
Constant 0.00725 0.0611* 0.0189 0.0542 0.000102 0.0796*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0329) (0.0266) (0.0369) (0.0230) (0.0250) 
       
Observations 768 859 768 859 768 859 
Number of i 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Time dummy NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Hansen 0.227 0.355 0.0607 0.0686 0.0720 0.681 
AR1 0.000255 7.06e-05 0.000210 0.000115 0.000170 7.86e-06 
AR2 0.0749 0.404 0.104 0.504 0.0602 0.479 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
